Consciousness and the Will: Celebrating the Work of Brian O’Shaughnessy – conference page


The Institute of Philosophy  in association with Heythrop College presents:

Consciousness and the Will:
Celebrating the Work of Brian O’Shaughnessy

Event Date: 17th- 19th June 2010
Beveridge Hall, Senate House, Malet St. London, WC1E 7HU

For over half a century, Brian O’Shaughnessy has been producing groundbreaking work in the philosophy of mind and action. O’Shaughnessy’s The Will (1980) set the agenda for three decades of research on bodily action and bodily awareness, and his Consciousness and the World (2000) is a manifesto for the centrality of notions of self-knowledge and mental agency in an understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness. In the wake of the (2008) publication of the revised edition of O’Shaughnessy’s first classic work on the will this conference brings together several generations of philosophers to celebrate O’Shaughnessy’s contribution to the discipline, in discussion of a range of themes drawn from, and related to, his work.

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Conference Programme:

Introduction: Barry Smith .


Mike Martin (UCL) – Celebrating the Life of Brian


Sir Jonathan Miller On the Move



June 17, Thursday

Christopher Peacocke (ColumbiaUCL)
Representing Causality  (AUDIO HERE)

Paul Snowdon (UCL)
Trying out the Trying Theory  (AUDIO HERE)


June 18, Friday

Thomas Baldwin (York)
The Mind’s Body and the Body Subject (AUDIO HERE)

Johannes Roessler (Warwick)
The Silence of Self-Knowledge (AUDIO HERE)

Hong Yu Wong (IP/Birkbeck)
Alienated Agency (AUDIO HERE)

Lucy O’Brien (UCL)
Knowledge of Actions and Tryings (AUDIO HERE)


June 19, Saturday

M.G.F. Martin (UCL)
Keeping up with O’Shaughnessy’s Appearances (AUDIO HERE)

Thomas Crowther (Heythrop)
The Epistemic Function of Wakeful Consciousness (AUDIO HERE)

Tyler Burge (UCLA)
Origins of Perception (AUDIO HERE)


Roundtable discussion led by Naomi Eilan (Warwick)



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